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WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 2013 NATIVE 
AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION MOOT COURT 
COMPETITION 
Zachary DiIonno* & Sommerset Wong** 
Questions Presented 
I. Does the Cush-Hook Nation, a tribe in existence since time 
immemorial, maintain aboriginal title to their ancestral lands situated in 
modern-day Kelley Point Park when that title has never been extinguished? 
II. Does Oregon have criminal jurisdiction to regulate the use of, and to 
protect, the culturally and religiously significant tribal objects belonging to 
the Cush-Hook Nation when those objects are located within federal lands 
and subject to federal law? 
Statement of the Case 
I. Statement of Facts 
The Cush-Hook Nation (“Cush-Hooks” or “Nation”) is a tribe of Indians 
whose original homelands are located at the confluence of the Columbia 
and Willamette Rivers.  ROA at 1.  The Cush-Hook Nation’s permanent 
village was located inside the present-day boundaries of Oregon’s Kelley 
Point State Park.  Id.  The Nation occupied this area since time immemorial 
and lived by hunting, fishing, growing crops, and harvesting wild plants, 
such as wapato.  Id. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Zachary DiIonno is a 2013 alumni of the William S. Richardson School of Law at 
the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa.  He served two years as a member of the NALSA Moot 
Court team for the University of Hawai‘i at Mânoa, garnering awards for 3rd Place Best 
Advocate and 3rd Place Best Brief in 2012, and 1st Place Best Brief in 2013. He also 
earned a Master's  Dgree in Education from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa and a 
Bachelor's Degree in Political Science from the Johns Hopkins University.  He is currently a 
Litigation Associate at the law firm Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing based in Honolulu, Hawai‘i. 
**  Sommerset Wong received her law degree, magna cum laude, from the University of 
Hawai‘i William S. Richardson School of Law in 2014, where she served as the Executive 
Editor for the University of Hawaii Law Review.  As a member of the Native American 
Moot Court Team, she was awarded First Place Best Brief in 2013 at the national 
competition, and also received the John S. Edmunds Award for Civility and Vigorous 
Advocacy in 2014.  She graduated from The George Washington University and received 
her Bachelors of Arts in Psychology with a minor in Criminal Justice in 2011, and is 
currently a law clerk at Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert in Honolulu, Hawai‘i. 
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On April 5, 1806, the Multnomah Indians, a neighboring tribe to the 
Cush-Hook Nation, introduced William Clark of the Lewis & Clark 
expedition to the chief of the Cush-Hook Nation.  Id.  While visiting the 
Cush-Hook Nation’s village, Clark drew sketches in his journals of the 
village and longhouses and recorded some ethnographic information about 
Cush-Hook governance, religion, culture, housing, agriculture, burial 
traditions, and hunting and fishing practices.  Id.  Clark also noted the tribal 
shamans’ practice of carving sacred totems and religious symbols into 
living trees.  Id.  Clark presented the Cush-Hook chief with one of the 
President Thomas Jefferson peace medals that Clark and Lewis customarily 
handed out to chiefs during their expedition.  Id.  These peace medals, also 
referred to as “sovereignty tokens” by historians, were distributed to Indian 
chiefs because of the political and diplomatic significance of the items.  Id.  
Lewis and Clark believed that an offering of these medals by the United 
States to tribal leaders demonstrated a United States’ desire to engage in 
political and commercial relations with tribes.  Id.  Essentially, the offering 
of these medals represented recognition of tribal leaders and their respective 
governments by the United States.  Id.  After Clark’s visit to the Cush-Hook 
Nation’s village, the tribe continued to live in their village in this particular 
area and engaged in their traditional ways of life across their territory for 
next forty-four years.  Id.   
In 1850, the Cush-Hook Nation signed a treaty with Anson Dart 
(“Dart”), the superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Oregon Territory.  Id.  
Dart’s focus was to displace the tribe from their land so that American 
settlers could move in and occupy the valuable farming lands along the 
river.  Id.  On behalf of the United States, Dart offered the Cush-Hook 
Nation a treaty promising compensation and benefits for their lands in and 
around modern-day Kelley Point Park.  ROA at 2.  In return, the Cush-Hook 
Nation agreed to move sixty miles westward to a specific location in the 
foothills of the Oregon coast range of mountains.  Id.   
Following the treaty signing, the entire Cush-Hook Nation relocated to 
the coast range, as promised, to avoid the encroaching American settlers.  
Id.  In 1853, however, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Cush-Hook 
treaty.  Id.  As a result, the United States never gave the Nation any of the 
promised compensation for their lands, nor did the United States deliver 
any of the other promised benefits of the treaty.  Id.  The United States did 
not recognize the Cush-Hook Nation’s ownership of the lands they moved 
to in the Oregon coast range of mountains.  Id.  Furthermore, since the 
treaty was not ratified, and the United States has not since undertaken any 
other act to “recognize” the Cush-Hooks, the Nation has remained a non-
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federally recognized tribe of Indians displaced from their original 
homelands.  Id.   
In the same year that the Cush-Hook Nation relocated following the 
treaty signing, the United States passed the Oregon Donation Land Act of 
1850, which encouraged and validated white settler claims to lands in the 
Oregon Territory conditioned on certain requirements.  Oregon Donation 
Land Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (1850); ROA at 2.  The Act granted fee simple 
title to “every white settler” who had “resided upon and cultivated the 
[land] for four consecutive years.”  § 4, 9 Stat. at 497; ROA at 2.   
Joe and Elsie Meek, two American settlers, claimed the 640 acres of land 
that comprised the Cush-Hook Nation’s ancestral lands.  ROA at 2.  The 
Meeks did not cultivate or live upon the land for the required four years, 
and thus failed to meet the conditions set forth in the Act.  Id.  Yet, the 
Meeks received fee simple title to the land from the United States.  Id.  In 
1880, the Meek’s descendants sold the land to the State of Oregon, which 
proceeded to created Kelley Point Park (“Park”).  Id.   
In 2011, Thomas Captain (“Captain”), a citizen of the Cush-Hook 
Nation, moved from the tribal area in the coast range of mountains to his 
tribe’s ancestral homelands in Kelley Point Park.  Id.  Captain returned to 
his tribe’s homeland to reassert his Nation’s ownership of the land, and to 
protect culturally and religiously significant trees that had grown in the 
Park for over three hundred years.  Id.  The trees are of great importance to 
the Cush-Hook religion and culture because tribal shamans/medicine men 
carved totem and religious symbols into living trees hundreds of years ago 
when the Nation inhabited the lands prior to their displacement by the 
United States.  Id.  This practice was noted in the journals of William Clark 
during his visit in 1806.  Id.  Despite the fact that the carved images are at a 
height of twenty-five to thirty feet from the ground, vandals have recently 
begun climbing the trees to deface the images.  Id.  In some instances, these 
thieves have cut the images off the trees to sell.  Id.  The state has done 
absolutely nothing to stop these illegal acts.  Id.  To prevent further damage 
to his tribe’s sacred totems and symbols, Captain occupied the Park to 
protect and preserve these crucial tribal objects.  In order to restore and 
protect a vandalized image that had been carved by one of his ancestors, 
Captain cut down the tree and removed the section of the tree that contained 
the image.  Id.  As Captain was returning to his Nation’s location in the 
Oregon coastal mountain range, state troopers arrested him and seized the 
image.  Id.     
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II. Statement of Proceedings 
The State of Oregon brought a criminal action against Thomas Captain 
for violating state law by allegedly trespassing on state lands, cutting timber 
in a state park without a permit, and desecrating an archaeological and 
historic site.  ROA at 2.  The Oregon Circuit Court for the County of 
Multnomah (“circuit court”) held a bench trial.  ROA at 3.  In its opinion, 
the circuit court made the following findings of facts and conclusions of 
law.  Id. 
The circuit court found that the Cush-Hook Nation was not a tribe 
included on the 1994 list of federally recognized Indian tribes.  Findings of 
Fact (“FOF” hereinafter) 8.  However, the court concluded that the Nation 
continues to own the land in question under aboriginal title.  Conclusions of 
Law (“COL” hereinafter) 4.  The court’s conclusion is strengthened by its 
finding that expert witnesses in history, sociology, and anthropology have 
established that the Cush-Hook Nation occupied, used, and owned the lands 
in question before the arrival of Euro-Americans.  FOF 1.   
The court further found that in 1850, the Cush-Hook Nation, having 
aboriginal title to the land, signed a treaty with Anson Dart, the 
superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Oregon Territory in which the 
Nation agreed to sell its land and relocate to a reservation in the Oregon 
coast range of mountains.  FOF 2.  The court found that the U.S. Senate 
refused to ratify this treaty, and subsequently never paid the Cush-Hook 
Nation for its lands, nor did it provide the Nation with any of the promised 
benefits for leaving its aboriginal territory.  FOF 3.  Accordingly, the court 
held that because of the Senate’s failure to ratify the treaty and compensate 
the Cush-Hook Nation, the Nation’s aboriginal title was never extinguished 
by the United States, as required by Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) 543 (1823).  COL 2.  
Because the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title to the land in question 
was never extinguished, the circuit court concluded that Congress erred in 
passing the Oregon Donation Land Act (Act) in 1850 because the Act 
described the lands of the Cush-Hook Nation as being “public lands” of the 
United States.  COL 4.  The court found that Joe and Elsie Meek applied for 
and received fee title to the land that encompassed the Cush-Hook village.  
FOF 4.  However, the court found that the Meeks did not fulfill the 
requirements of the Act because they did not live on the land for more than 
two years nor did they cultivate it.  FOF 5.  Thus, the court held that the 
Meek’s failure to meet the requirements voided ab initio the grant of fee 
simple title to the Meeks and the subsequent sale of lands to the Meeks’ 
descendants.  COL at 3.  
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In 2011, vandals defaced the sacred totems in Kelley Point Park.  ROA 
at 2.  Thomas Captain returned to the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal lands 
in the Park to protect the sacred totems.  Id.  Captain erected temporary 
housing in Kelley Point Park at the site of his Nation’s ancient village.  
FOF 6.  He cut down an archaeologically, culturally, and historically 
significant tree containing a tribal cultural and religious symbol.  FOF 7.  
Subsequently, Captain was charged under Oregon state law.  The circuit 
court held that Or. Rev. Stat. 358.905-358.961 and Or. Rev. Stat. 390.235-
390.240 applied to all lands in the State of Oregon under 18 U.S.C. § 1162 
(2012) (“Public Law 280” hereinafter), whether they were tribally owned or 
not, and thus Oregon properly brought this criminal action against Captain 
for damaging an archaeological, cultural, and historical object.  COL 5.  
The court found Captain guilty for violating Or. Rev. Stat. 358.905-358.961 
(2011) and Or. Rev. Stat. 390.235-390.240 (2011) for damaging an 
archaeological site and a cultural and historical artifact and fined him $250.  
ROA at 4.  However, the court held that the Cush-Hook Nation still owned 
the land within the Park and found Captain not guilty for trespass or for 
cutting timber without a state permit.  Id. 
Both the State and Thomas Captain appealed the circuit court’s decision.  
Id.  The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision 
without writing an opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review.  
Id.  The State then filed a petition and cross petition for certiorari and 
Captain filed a cross petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court.  Id. 
Jurisdictional Statement 
 The judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals, the highest court in 
which a decision was made, was entered when the court affirmed the 
decision of the Oregon Circuit Court for the County of Multnomah without 
writing an opinion. Following the denial of writ of certiorari by the Oregon 
Supreme Court, the petition for writ of certiorari with this Court was timely 
filed and granted. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 
(2006). 
Summary of the Argument 
The Cush-Hook Nation has maintained its aboriginal title to the lands in 
Kelley Point Park since their establishment of that title by occupancy since 
“time immemorial.”  The Cush-Hook Nation is a tribe that was recognized 
by Lewis from the Lewis and Clark Expedition by the sovereignty tokens 
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that he offered to the head chief of the Nation.  See ROA at 1.  At the time 
of Lewis’s encounter with the Cush-Hook Nation in 1805, there was no 
formal federal recognition process.  Rather, United States officials used 
sovereignty tokens as a means to demonstrate the United States’ interest in 
establishing political and diplomatic relations with tribes.  Lewis extended 
sovereignty tokens, documented the Nation’s activities and established 
government, which further substantiates the validity of the Cush-Hook 
Nation’s aboriginal title to the land.  See id.  Not only did the Cush-Hook 
Nation clearly establish their aboriginal title, the Cush-Hook Nation has 
also retained that title to the present. 
Congress has made it clear that aboriginal title can be extinguished 
through conquest and purchase.  Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 
543, 587 (1823).  However, with respect to the Cush-Hook Nation, 
Congress did not take any steps to extinguish that title through either 
method.  The United States has and maintains a peaceable relationship with 
the Nation and thus no evidence of conquest exists.  As for purchase, 
although the Cush-Hook Nation did enter into treaty negotiations with the 
superintendent for Indian Affairs in the Oregon Territory, these negotiations 
were never ratified by the United States Congress and therefore were never 
valid.  See ROA at 1.  Further, because the United States never fulfilled the 
requirements of the treaty, there was no purchase by the United States of 
the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal lands.  Finally, though Congress may 
extinguish title by an explicit act, this was never done.  United States v. 
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941).  In passing the Oregon 
Donation Land Act, Congress did not explicitly extinguish aboriginal title 
and therefore the title continues to remain with the Cush-Hook Nation. 
The final way to extinguish a tribe’s aboriginal title to land is voluntary 
abandonment by the tribe.  Williams v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 434, 437 
(1917).  In this case, however, the Cush-Hook Nation did not voluntarily 
abandon the lands in modern-day Kelley Point Park. Although the departure 
of the Cush-Hook Nation from the lands at issue in accordance with the 
treaty provisions could have constituted abandonment, the treaty was never 
ratified and therefore the Nation’s displacement was unlawful.  Thus, not 
only has the Cush-Hook Nation established aboriginal title, the Nation has 
also maintained that title because its title to the lands has never been 
extinguished or abandoned.  For the foregoing reasons, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals was correct in finding that the Cush-Hook Nation established and 
maintained aboriginal title. 
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Following the Cush-Hook Nation’s displacement from its original 
homelands in1850, the United States passed the Oregon Donation Land Act 
to encourage settlers to move to the newly “discovered” western frontier as 
part of the United States’ domestic policy of “Manifest Destiny.”  In order 
to receive fee simple title to land, “every white settler” needed to reside 
upon and cultivate the land for four consecutive years.  Oregon Donation 
Land Act, ch. 76, § 4, 9 Stat. 496, 497 (1850).  Congress erred, however, in 
passing the Act when it described all the lands in the Oregon Territory as 
being public lands of the United States because the Cush-Hook Nation 
never relinquished their claim to the land, nor did the United States 
extinguish the Nation’s aboriginal title.     
Nonetheless, Joe and Elsie Meek, two American settlers, applied for and 
received fee title to 640 acres of land that today encompasses the Cush-
Hook village despite failing to meet the explicit conditions to properly 
obtain the land title in accordance with the Act.  The Meeks’ descendants 
sold the land to Oregon in 1880 and Oregon proceeded to create the Kelley 
Point Park.  The Meeks should have never received title to the land because 
they failed to live on the land for more than two years, and never cultivated 
the land, hence, failing to meet the conditions of the Act.  See Hall v. 
Russell, 101 U.S. 503, 504 (1880).  Therefore, the lower court was correct 
in holding that the United States’ grant of fee simple title to the land at 
issue to the Meeks under the Oregon Donation Land Act was void ab initio 
and that the subsequent sale of the land by the Meek’s descendants to the 
State of Oregon was also void.  Thus, the land therefore still resides within 
the jurisdiction of the federal government and Oregon is precluded from 
asserting its criminal jurisdiction over Captain’s activities on federal land.   
The State of Oregon is a Public Law 280 state, which allows the State to 
extend its criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country.  If the land in 
question is not found to be federal land outright, then it fits the 
qualifications for “Indian country.”  While Public Law 280 clearly provides 
that the General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act no longer applied in 
those regions, federal power to enforce federal laws of general applicability 
remains.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) (2012).  Crimes of general applicability 
remained within the subject matter of the federal courts despite the passage 
of Public Law 280 and its delegation of criminal jurisdiction to certain 
states.  See, e.g., United States  v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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Further, a fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has 
the power to preempt state law.  Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 
530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (citing U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2).  Oregon has no 
authority to assert jurisdiction over Thomas Captain in Indian country 
because its laws are preempted by two federal statutes, the Archaeological 
Resources Protection Act (“ARPA” hereinafter) and Native American  
Grave and Protection Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA” hereinafter).  
Congress passed ARPA in 1979, in part, to “secure, for the present and 
future benefit of the American people, the protection of archaeological 
resources and sites which are on public lands and Indian lands.”  16 U.S.C. 
§ 470aa(b) (2012).  In 1990, Congress enacted NAGPRA, in part, with the 
principal objective of establishing a legal regime for the protection of 
Native American human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and 
objects of cultural patrimony presently on federal and tribal lands from 
unauthorized excavation or removal.   
NAGPRA is “[f]ederal law, and, as such, under the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution preempts any state law on the same subject matter. . . . This 
is especially true in the field of Federal Indian law, where the United States 
has plenary and exclusive power.”  Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act Regulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 12,380 (Mar. 15, 2010) (codified 
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10) (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).  Additionally, a preemption of state 
law need not be explicit—a state’s regulation of a particular field that is so 
thoroughly occupied by Congress to exclusion of the states warrants 
preemption.  See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).  The 
State of Oregon seeks to tread into an area of law that has clearly been 
occupied by the federal government through two congressional acts which 
provide a comprehensive legal regime for archaeological and cultural 
preservation of sites and resources relating to Native American people.  The 
Oregon statutes are virtually a recitation of the federal laws, but are limited 
in application to the lands that under Oregon’s jurisdiction.  Because the 
land in question falls under “Indian country,” both ARPA and NAGPRA 
preempt Oregon’s laws.  A finding that Oregon’s jurisdiction is not 
preempted by the operation of federal law would severely interfere with 
federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, and Oregon’s interests at 
stake do not rise to the sufficient level to assert its authority.  Therefore, this 
Court should also dismiss Oregon’s claim against Thomas Captain on the 








I. The Cush-Hook Nation Maintains Aboriginal Title to Their Ancestral 
Lands Enclosed by Modern-Day Kelley Point Park Because the Federal 
Government’s Acquisition of the Land Was Invalid According to Clear 
Federal Indian Law Precedent. 
A. The Cush-Hook Nation Has Established Aboriginal Title to the Lands 
in Question by Its Actual and Exclusive Use and Occupancy of the Land 
Prior to the Loss of the Property.  
Indian aboriginal title, commonly referred to as the “right of occupancy” 
or the “right of possession,” was first recognized in United States 
jurisprudence in 1823 in the decision of Johnson v. M’Intosh.  Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  In Johnson, the Supreme Court 
of the United States asserted that “[i]t has never been contended that the 
Indian title amounted to nothing.  Their right of possession has never been 
questioned.  The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate 
title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of 
acquiring that right.”  Id. at 603.  “An Indian tribe establishes aboriginal 
title by showing that it has inhabited the land ‘from time immemorial.’”  
Greene v. Rhode Island, 398 F.3d 45, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Mashpee 
Tribe v. Sec’y of the Interior, 820 F.2d 480, 481-82 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 
234 (1985))).  The tribe must show “historical evidence of the tribe’s long-
standing physical possession” of the land.  Greene, 398 F.3d at 49-50 
(quoting Zuni Indian Tribe v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 670, 671 (1989)).  
This Court has stated that the “[o]ccupancy necessary to establish 
aboriginal possession is a question of fact to be determined as any other 
question of fact.”  United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 
345 (1941).  The standard of review for questions of fact is the clearly 
erroneous standard.  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145 (1986). 
In this case, the Oregon Court of Appeals properly concluded that the 
Cush-Hook Nation owns the land in the modern-day Kelley Point Park 
under aboriginal title.  COL 4.  The Cush-Hook Nation maintains aboriginal 
title to the lands in question because it has met the factors set forth by the 
Indian Claims Commission Act to establish aboriginal title.  From 1946 to 
1978, the Indian Claims Commission Act was tasked with hearing claims of 
Indian tribes against the United States.  An Act of August 13, 1946, ch. 
959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946).  These claims included land disputes where the 
court often determined whether a tribe had aboriginal title.  See id.  At the 
termination of this Commission, Indian claims were transferred to the Court 
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of Claims where they are presently adjudicated.  28 U.S.C. §1505 (2012).  
During the period of the Indian Claims Commission, the Commission 
established ways of determining aboriginal title. These factors were laid out 
in Otoe & Missouria Tribe v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 593 (1955).  The 
court found that: 
 [C]laimant Indians had established their Indian title by means 
of, inter alia, (1) evidence that no other tribes claimed or used 
the areas involved and that neighboring tribes recognized these 
lands as being the exclusive property of the claimant Indians, (2) 
earlier official recognition of the claimants' exclusive Indian title 
to the lands, and (3) expert testimony of historians in the field of 
American history and statements of government Indian officials, 
and the court upheld this decision, noting that the record 
contained substantial support for the finding of Indian title. 
Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal 
Title to Indian Lands, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 425 (1979) (citing Otoe & Missouria 
Tribe v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 593 (1955)). These factors have much in 
common with the definition of aboriginal title as existing for tribes from 
“time immemorial.” Greene, 398 F.3d at 49-50. The Indian Claims 
Commission factors are directly in line with the requirements as set forth by 
Johnson v. McIntosh to demonstrate right of occupancy.  In Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, the Court determined that Indian tribes maintained a “right of 
occupancy” interest when they occupied and used land to the exclusion of 
others.  See generally Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Proof and 
Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 425 
(1979) (citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 573 (1823)).  
 In this case, the Cush-Hook Nation has established its aboriginal title by 
its occupation, use, and ownership of the land prior to the arrival of the 
Euro-Americans.  FOF 1.  The Cush-Hook Nation first engaged with 
William Clark in 1806.  During his encounter, Clark documented the 
occupation and use of the land by the Nation.  He sketched the established 
villages and longhouses that occupied the land, and noted the Nation’s 
cultural, religious, and traditional practices of the Cush-Hook Nation.  This 
documentation, coupled with the recognition of the Nation’s homelands by 
the neighboring Multnomah Indians, indisputably determines the 
establishment of the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title to the land.  Thus, 
the Cush-Hook Nation fulfills the requirements to establish aboriginal title 
and there is no evidence that federal government extinguished that title. 
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B. The Cush-Hook Nation’s Aboriginal Title to the Land in Question Still 
Exists Today Because It Was Never Extinguished 
The court was correct in concluding that the Cush-Hook Nation’s 
aboriginal title to its homelands in Kelley Point Park was never 
extinguished as required by law. “Aboriginal title is title to land that the 
Indians inhabited from time immemorial, which cannot be extinguished 
without explicit action by Congress.”  Greene v. Rhode Island, 289 F. Supp. 
2d 5, 9 (D.R.I. 2003) aff'd, 398 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Oneida 
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. at 234–35).  Congress’s failure to extinguish the 
Nation’s aboriginal title through any valid method, and the wrongful 
displacement of the Nation by the United States without the ratified treaty, 
vests aboriginal title to the land in the Nation. 
i. The Court Was Correct in Finding That the Cush-Hook Nation’s 
Aboriginal Title to the Land Has Never Been Extinguished by Congress 
Because There Has Been No Conquest or Purchase. 
Indian aboriginal title, though a right that has never been questioned, 
may be extinguished by an explicit act of Congress.  Santa Fe Pac. R.R. 
Co., 314 U.S. at 347.  Federal intent to extinguish aboriginal title, must be 
clear, but may take various forms.  Greene v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 45 (1st. 
Cir. 2005).  This right gives the United States “exclusive right to extinguish 
the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or conquest.” Johnson, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.  However, the Indian right of occupancy shall not 
be disturbed without the tribe’s “free consent.”  Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 55 (1831).   
The United States could have extinguished the Cush-Hook Nation’s title 
by conquest.  This Court has stated that “[c]onquest gives a title which the 
courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative 
opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim 
which has been successfully asserted.”  Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588.  
Though an extinguishment of the Nation’s title by the United States through 
conquest is a proper method of extinguishment, the United States never 
took this course of action.  To the contrary, Lewis gifted “sovereignty 
tokens” to the Cush-Hook Nation’s chief, an act that has been historically 
noted to have political and diplomatic significance.  Because there was no 
method of federal recognition at the time of Clark’s discovery of the 
Nation, the process of sovereignty tokens was such that established a 
relationship between the existing tribes in the lands which were 
encountered by the Americans and the sovereign United States.  
Accordingly, the Cush-Hook Nation’s title was never extinguished by 
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conquest and the Cush-Hook Nation continues to possess its aboriginal title 
to the land. 
Just as it is clear that the Cush-Hook Nation’s title was never 
extinguished by conquest, the aboriginal title was also never extinguished 
by purchase.  In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the court stated that Indians “were 
admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just 
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own 
discretion.”  Id. at 574.  This title, however, was purchasable by the 
sovereign with the consent of the tribe, at the price the tribe was willing to 
take, without coercion.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 517 
(1832), abrogated on other grounds by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 
(2001).  Thus, Congress could approve the United States’ purchase of the 
Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title so long as the tribe consented to the 
sale at an agreeable price and without coercion.  In order for a treaty to be 
valid, the Senate must ratify the treaty.  However, the executive branch, 
which includes executive officers such as Anson Dart, was responsible for 
the initiation of the process of creating and negotiating these treaties with 
tribes.  Karuk Tribe v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  At 
the time that the Cush-Hook Nation was negotiating its treaty with the 
United States, many executive officials were doing the same in various 
parts of the western United States.  Id.  In many of these cases, the 
executives acted upon these treaties despite the Senate’s failure to ratify 
them, “render[ing] them legal nullities.”   Id.   
The same circumstances exist in the present case.  Anson Dart negotiated 
a treaty with the Nation where the Nation agreed to sell its aboriginal title to 
the United States with the expectation that they would receive 
compensation for the lands in and around modern-day Kelley Point Park, 
recognized ownership of the lands to which they moved, and other 
promised treaty benefits.  ROA at 2.  Under this agreement, the Cush-Hook 
Nation’s title would have been extinguished by purchase because there was 
consent by the Nation to sell at a willing price and without coercion.  
However, that is not the actual case.  Rather, the Nation was misled to 
believe that the treaty benefits would flow from the extinguishment of the 
aboriginal title, but Congress’ failure to ratify the treaty voided the treaty 
altogether.  Thus, the Cush-Hook Nation’s right of occupancy and 
aboriginal title could not have been and was not extinguished by purchase.   
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ii. Even Though Congress Has Extended Extinguishment to Include 
Explicit Extinguishment, the United States Never Explicitly Extinguished 
the Cush-Hook Nation’s Aboriginal Title and Therefore the Tribe Has 
Retained Aboriginal Title. 
The final way that this Court recognizes that Congress has terminated a 
tribe’s aboriginal title is through an explicit extinguishment.  This Court has 
held that “extinguishment cannot be lightly implied in view of the avowed 
solicitude of the Federal Government for the welfare of its Indian wards.”  
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 354.  Congress is the branch of 
government that has the absolute authority to extinguish aboriginal title.  
Thus, Congress’ failure to ratify the treaty with the Nation is a clear 
indication that Congress never meant to extinguish the aboriginal title and 
therefore the Cush Hook Nation still retains Indian title to the land.  In the 
treaty between the United States and the Cush-Hook Nation, the United 
States promised benefits such as federal recognition and a reservation for 
their continued living in a new location in exchange for their claims to the 
land at issue.  However, Congress refused to ratify this treaty, thereby 
preserving the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title to the land.   
This Court has held that agreements between the United States and 
Indians “are to be liberally interpreted to accomplish their protective 
purposes, with ambiguities to be resolved in favor of the Indians.”  
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).  The treaty included 
provisions such as “promised compensation for [the Nation’s] lands in and 
around modern-day Kelley Point Park . . . and other promised benefits of 
the treaty, and the recognized ownership of the lands in return for the 
Nation agreeing to move to the lands in the coast range of mountains.”  
ROA at 2.  In order to comply with Carpenter, these provisions must be 
interpreted in favor of the Cush-Hook Nation.  “A treaty, including one 
between the United States and an Indian tribe, is essentially a contract 
between two sovereign nations.”  Washington v. Wash. State Commercial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979).  Because it is 
clear that the Cush-Hook Nation wanted to establish a political and 
diplomatic relationship with the United States by accepting the sovereignty 
tokens and entering into a treaty, the only just way to interpret these 
ambiguities is to have the treaty “construed as [it was] understood by the 
tribal representatives who participated in their negotiation.”  Tulee v. 
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).   
In this case, the Cush-Hook Nation expected that this treaty would 
establish rights and benefits for them as a tribe in exchange for the 
extinguishment of their aboriginal title.  The Nation’s land was in a prime 
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location at the confluence of two major rivers.  ROA at 1.  The Cush-Hook 
Nation was willing to extinguish its aboriginal title only because it expected 
to receive ownership rights to another piece of land, other promised benefits 
including federal recognition, and monetary compensation in return.  ROA 
at 2.  By interpreting the treaty as it should be, in favor of Indians, the 
subsequent refusal of ratification is the opposite of an explicit congressional 
act of extinguishment.  In fact, by refusing to ratify a treaty that would 
explicitly extinguish aboriginal title, Congress did not extinguish the Cush-
Hook Nation’s aboriginal title.  Thus, the tribe maintains their title to the 
lands in Kelley Point Park. 
Even if this Court finds that Congress's failure to ratify the treaty is not a 
clear indication of the Nation’s continued claim to aboriginal title, the 
Cush-Hook Nation retains aboriginal title because Congress has never 
explicitly extinguished Indian title as required by its “avowed solicitude. . . 
for the welfare of its Indian wards.”  See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. 
R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 354.  The circuit court correctly concluded that 
“Congress erred in the Oregon Donation Land Act when it described all the 
lands in the Oregon Territory as being public lands of the United States.”  
COL 1.  In the Oregon Donation Land Act of 1850, Congress declared that 
“every white settler” living on “public lands” that had “resided upon and 
cultivated the [land] for four consecutive years” was to be granted fee 
simple title to the land.  Oregon Donation Land Act, ch. 76, § 4, 9 Stat. 496, 
497 (1850).  However, by deeming the lands in Kelley Point Park as 
eligible under the Act, not only did Congress err because the Cush-Hook 
Nation had aboriginal title to the lands, but Congress did not expressly 
extinguish the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title.   
Historically, Congress has expressly extinguished aboriginal title, as 
evidenced in the Alaska Native Settlement Act (“ANSA” hereinafter).  
ANSA explicitly stated that “[a]ll aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of 
aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and occupancy, including submerged 
land underneath all water areas, both inland and offshore, and including any 
aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that may exist, are hereby 
extinguished.”  43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012).  The Ninth Circuit upheld this 
extinguishment and stated, “We hold that the [aforementioned] Act 
extinguished not only the aboriginal titles of all Alaska Natives, but also 
every claim ‘based on’ aboriginal title in the sense that the past or present 
existence of aboriginal title is an element of the claim.”  United States v. 
Atl. Richfield Co., 612 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1980).  This is an example 
of Congress’s explicit extinguishment of a claim of aboriginal title, which is 
not evident in the present case.  At best, the Oregon Donation Land Act was 
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an act to define the uses of public lands, not those lands which retained 
unextinguished aboriginal title.  This Act did not make any mention of 
Indian title nor did it make any reference to the extinguishment of Indian 
aboriginal title.  Congress is apprised of the standard for extinguishment of 
Indian title, as expressed in the Alaska Native Settlement Act, and yet it 
took none of those measures when creating the Oregon Donation Land Act.  
Thus, the Cush-Hook Nation maintains aboriginal title because its title has 
not been extinguished by Congress in any way. 
iii. The Cush-Hook Nation Never Relinquished Its Title by Abandonment 
Because Anson Dart Wrongfully Displaced the Cush-Hook Nation from 
Its Aboriginal Lands. 
“Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference to their 
habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual 
possession as the cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to its 
exclusive enjoyment in their own way and for their own purposes were as 
much respected until they abandoned them, made a cession to the 
government, or an authorized sale to individuals. . . . In either case their 
rights became extinct. . . .” Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 
746 (1835) (emphasis added).  
Abandonment has long been regarded as the way in which an Indian 
tribe may voluntarily extinguish its aboriginal title to its lands.  See id.  
Abandonment is not an involuntary act but one that requires volition and 
consent to constitute an extinguishment of aboriginal title.  The act of 
moving off tribal lands is only seen as an abandonment when there are 
“specific circumstances to warrant that conclusion.”  Turtle Mountain Band 
of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 945 (Ct. Cl. 1974).  
Further, “the unilateral action of an officer of the executive branch cannot 
eliminate Indian title.”  Id. 
Though the Cush-Hook Nation moved from its aboriginal lands, their 
alleged “abandonment” was not voluntary, but rather a wrongful 
displacement under false pretenses.  After the treaty failed to be ratified, the 
United States took no documented measures to show that it informed the 
Cush-Hook Nation of their wrongful displacement, and there is no evidence 
that the Nation’s failure to return to the land was voluntary.   
In Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U.S. 55 (1886), this Court 
recognized Indian land abandonment when a treaty signed by a tribe to cede 
its aboriginal lands did not take effect until the tribe moved to a reservation 
set aside for them by the United States.  Id. at 70.  This Court found that 
“[t]he relinquishment thus made was as effectual as a formal act of cession.  
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Their right of occupancy was, in effect, abandoned; and, full consideration 
for it being afterwards paid, it could not be resumed.”  Id. at 69-70.  This 
Court held that the tribe’s relinquishment of its aboriginal title, 
accompanied by the treaty recognizing its cession, “may properly be treated 
as establishing the extinguishment of their title from its date, so far as the 
United States are concerned.”  Id. at 70. 
Further, Congress never ratified a treaty recognizing cession or a formal 
relinquishment of the Nation’s land for which consideration was paid.  The 
Cush-Hook Nation signed the treaty and abided by its terms because it 
believed the agreement to be valid.  Thus, it is clear that the mere actions of 
Anson Dart, an officer of the executive, did not constitute extinguishment.  
See Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 490 F.2d at 945.   
 Additionally, the relocation of the Cush-Hook Nation pursuant to the 
treaty with Anson Dart was not an extinguishment of the Nation’s title to 
the lands in Kelley Point Park because a relinquishment alone does not 
constitute abandonment for the purposes of extinguishment of Indian title.  
The members of the Cush-Hook Nation moved to the new land because 
they were operating under the contract that they had made with Anson Dart.  
Though Anson Dart had the authority to negotiate treaties with Indian tribes 
pursuant to the Act Authorizing the Negotiation of Treaties with the Indian 
Tribes in the Territory of Oregon, he did not have the authority to carry out 
the removal of the Cush-Hook Nation without congressional approval.  
Thus, the abandonment was not voluntary and did not constitute an 
extinguishment of the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title.  An Act 
Authorizing the Negotiation of Treaties with the Indian Tribes in the 
Territory of Oregon, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 437, 437 (1850).  Therefore, the Cush-
Hook Nation retained Indian title, which was never extinguished because 
the Nation established it, Congress never extinguished it, and the Nation 
never abandoned it. 
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II. Oregon Is Precluded From Asserting Criminal Jurisdiction Over 
Thomas Captain for Excavating and Removing Sacred Objects Because the 
Objects Are Located Within Federal Lands and Are Subject to Federal 
Laws. 
A. The Cush-Hook Nation’s Homelands Situated in Kelley Point Park 
Are Under Federal Jurisdiction and Not Owned by the State of Oregon 
Because Congress Erred in the Oregon Donation Land Act When It 
Deemed All Lands as Being “Public,” Voiding Any Subsequent 
Conveyance of the Land.  
The Oregon Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Or. Rev. Stat. 
358.905-358.961 and Or. Rev. Stat. 390.235-390.240 applied to all lands in 
the State of Oregon under Public Law 280, whether the lands were tribally 
owned or not.  Public Law 280 only applies the laws of Oregon to those 
lands defined as “Indian Country,” not all federal lands.  In this case, the 
land in modern-day Kelley Point Park is federal land and not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the State of Oregon, notwithstanding the extension of 
Oregon’s jurisdiction through Public Law 280.   
i. The Oregon Court of Appeals Was Correct in Determining that the 
Cush-Hook Nation’s Homelands Cannot Be Considered “Public Lands” 
Subject to Alienation to the Meeks, or Subsequently the State of Oregon, 
Under the Oregon Donation Land Act. 
The lower court properly held that Congress erred in promulgating the 
Oregon Donation Land Act when it described all the lands in the Oregon 
Territory as being “public lands” of the United States.  COL 1.  As 
discussed earlier, the Cush-Hook Nation owns the land in question under 
aboriginal title because its aboriginal title has never been 
extinguished.  COL 2, 5.  
In 1850, Congress passed the Oregon Donation Land Act to stimulate 
white settler movements into the fledgling territory that was occupied by 
Indian tribes.  See generally Oregon Donation Land Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 
(1850).  Earlier legislation, however, necessitated that Indian title to land be 
extinguished before land could become part of the public domain.  When 
Congress passed the Oregon Territorial Act of 1848 establishing, inter alia, 
the Territory of Oregon, the Act guaranteed Indians rights to their 
homelands “so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty 
between the United States and such Indians.”  Act to Establish the 
Territorial Government of Oregon, ch. 177, § 1, 9 Stat. 323, 323 (1848).  
Prior to passing the Oregon Donation Land Act, Congress enacted a law 
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that authorized the appointment of commissioners to negotiate treaties with 
Oregon tribes “for the Extinguishment of their Claims to Lands lying west 
of the Cascade Mountains.”  An Act Authorizing the Negotiation of 
Treaties with the Indian Tribes in the Territory of Oregon, 9 Stat. at 437.  
Additionally, the Act gave the commissioners the discretion to remove all 
these small tribes and leave the whole of the most desirable portion open to 
white settlers.  Id.  Consequently, the majority of the Territory of Oregon 
was entered into the public domain as a result of the confiscation of Indian 
land through the treaty process. 
In this case, the Cush-Hook Nation’s retention of aboriginal title 
prevents the declaration of those lands as public.  Although Anson Dart 
negotiated with the Cush-Hook Nation to relocate sixty miles westward, 
this was in exchange of land, promised benefits, and compensation.  Id.   If 
the Senate had indeed ratified this treaty, its declaration of the lands as 
public would have been in accordance with the extinguishment of 
aboriginal title by a ratified treaty.  However, the U.S. Senate refused to 
ratify the treaty and the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title to the land was 
not extinguished.  Therefore, the lands in Kelley Point Park could not have 
been deemed public and conveyed to the Meeks, or subsequently to the 
State of Oregon, through the Oregon Donation Land Act.  
ii. Because the Meeks’ Sale of Land to Oregon Was Void Ab Initio, the 
Meeks Never Gained Lawful Title to the Land Through the Oregon 
Donation Land Act, and the Land Still Remains Under Federal 
Jurisdiction. 
The Oregon Donation Land Act allowed an adult white male to claim up 
to 320 acres of land for himself, and, if he were married, another 320 acres 
in his wife’s name, so long as he resided on and cultivated the land for four 
consecutive years.  See Oregon Donation Land Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 
(1850). 
The Oregon Supreme Court has recognized that although a fee simple 
title vests in the donors for lands of a “donation claim” from the date of 
their settlement, this title is subject to be defeated by non-compliance with 
the conditions expressed in the Oregon Donation Land Act.  McKay v. 
Freeman, 6 Or. 449, 452-53 (1877).  Thus, a failure to meet the conditions 
of the Oregon Donation Land Act rendered the fee simple title invalid and 
reverted title back to the United States.  See generally id. 
This Court has recognized a settler’s failure to comply with Section 4 of 
the Oregon Donation Land Act barred him from passing title to the land to 
his heirs.  In Hall v. Russell, the question before the court was whether the 
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heirs of a settler could receive lands passed by will from a settler who died 
before the expiration of the four-year residence and cultivation requirement.  
Hall v. Russell, 101 U.S. 503, 504 (1880).  In 1852, devisor settled on the 
land in dispute with a view to becoming its owner under the operation of 
the Oregon Donation Land Act.  Id. at 503-04.  Devisor met the 
qualifications necessary to enable him to initially take and hold land under 
the Act.  Id.  However, he died without fulfilling the qualifications 
necessary to perfect title, but nonetheless left a will devising his estate to 
his heirs.  Id.  If the Court found that the land patent descended from the 
devisor, despite his failure to fulfill the requirements, then the devisor 
would have had a devisable estate.  Hall, 101 U.S. at 504.  However, the 
Court concluded that when devisor died, he had nothing in the land which 
he could transmit to his heirs, so that anything the heirs received came from 
the United States.  Id. at 513-14.  Therefore, the heirs could not obtain the 
legal tract of land because it reverted back to the federal government, which 
subsequently vested ownership in another settler who fulfilled the 
requirement.  Id. 
In the present case, the Meeks failed to fulfill the terms of the Oregon 
Donation Land Act and did not obtain legal title to the land.  See id. at 504.  
The Meeks failed to meet the Act’s requirements and thus the title reverted 
back to the federal government, which retained the title just as it did in 
Hall.  See id.  Therefore, the Meeks could not transfer any title to their 
descendants because they had no title to transfer as a result of having had 
their title defeated by failure to comply with the requirements.  McKay, 6 
Or. at 452-53.  
The State of Oregon does not own the land where Captain acquired the 
sacred totem.  Rather, the federal government still retains ownership over 
the land because, as the lower court concluded, the United States’ grant of 
fee simple title to the land at issue to the Meeks was void ab initio because 
the Meeks did not fulfill the explicit conditions of the Oregon Donation 
Land Act.  ROA at 2.  Hence, the grant of the land to the Meeks’ 
descendants and subsequent sale of land to State of Oregon was also void 
because the Meeks did not have proper title.  COL 3; ROA at 2.  Because 
the land reverted back to the federal government’s jurisdiction when the 
Meeks failed to satisfy the conditions of the Oregon Donation Land Act, the 
lands remain under federal jurisdiction and Oregon’s laws relating to 
archaeological sites do not govern Captain’s actions on federal lands. 
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B. Even if the Land in Question Is Considered “Indian Country,” 
Oregon’s Laws Are Preempted by Federal Law, Notwithstanding Public 
Law 280, and the State Does Not Have Criminal Jurisdiction over 
Captain’s Use and Removal of the Cush-Hook Nation’s Sacred Objects. 
i. Under Montoya, the Cush-Hook Nation Is an “Indian Tribe” of Which 
Thomas Captain Is a Member, and the Nation’s Existing Aboriginal Title 
to the Land in Question Qualifies the Land as “Indian Country.” 
In Montoya v. United States, this Court has held that an Indian tribe is “a 
body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under 
one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes 
ill-defined territory.”  Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).  
The Cush-Hook Nation qualifies as an “Indian tribe” because its members 
are of a similar race, united in a community under one chief, and once 
inhabited a defined territory.  Further, the Cush-Hook Nation is the only 
Native tribe to the defined territory of modern-day Kelley Point Park.  ROA 
at 2.  According to Clark’s journal records, Clark was escorted by the 
Multnomah Indians to the established Cush-Hook Nation village and 
longhouses, which provides evidence that the Nation inhabited a particular, 
defined area.  ROA at 1.  Clark gave the Cush-Hook chief “sovereignty 
tokens,” which demonstrated the United States’ desire to engage in political 
and diplomatic relations with the Nation and symbolized that tribal leaders 
and governments would be recognized by the United States.  It is clear 
through the facts that the Cush-Hook Nation existed in the territory since 
time immemorial and its members were all of the same race, governed by a 
chief, and living within a clearly demarcated territory as drawn by Clark 
and recognized by the Multnomah tribe.  Therefore, the Cush-Hook Nation 
constitutes a tribe pursuant to the definition set forth by Montoya, though 
admittedly not federally recognized according to the 1994 tribal list act.  
FOF 3. 
As a citizen of the Cush-Hook Nation, Captain is therefore considered an 
“Indian.”  See ROA at 2.  The Ninth Circuit established that the test for 
determining whether one is an Indian, for purposes of Public Law 280, is to 
determine the “degree of Indian blood” and the “tribal or governmental 
recognition as an Indian.”  United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 
1263 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 849; see also United States v. 
Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).  “A person may still be an Indian 
though not enrolled with a recognized tribe.”  St. Cloud v. United States, 
702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988) (citing Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 
1263; United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (9th Cir.1974).  Given 
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Captain’s status as a citizen of the Cush-Hook Nation and descendent of the 
Cush-Hook’s ancestors, he may be considered an “Indian” for the purposes 
of determining whether the State of Oregon can assert jurisdiction over him. 
Regarding the status of the land in question, Congress has broadly 
defined “Indian country” to include, inter alia, formal and informal 
reservations (notwithstanding the issuance of any patent).  Oklahoma Tax 
Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 124 (1993); United States v. 
John, 437 U.S. 634, 648 (1978) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151).  This Court has 
held that the term “Indian Country” also embraces all land within the 
United States to which the aboriginal title has never been extinguished.  See 
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 559-61 (1883)).  The term “Indian 
country” is used generally to describe land in the occupation of the Indians, 
to which their title or right of occupancy has not been extinguished.  See id.  
As established earlier, the Cush-Hook Nation owns the land in question 
under aboriginal title.  Even if this Court finds that lands situated in 
modern-day Kelley Point Park do not fall exclusively under the ownership 
of the federal government, the lands are certainly considered part of “Indian 
country” for jurisdictional purposes. 
Accordingly, the State of Oregon does not have criminal jurisdiction 
over Captain for the acts committed because notwithstanding Oregon’s 
incorrect expansion of authority under Public Law 280, Oregon’s statutes 
relating to the protection of archaeological sites and cultural objects are 
preempted by federal law. 
ii. Under the Principles of Federal Preemption, Congress Intended the 
ARPA and NAGPRA to “Occupy the Field” of Law with Respect to 
Archaeological Preservation of Native American Sites and Artifacts on 
Federal and Indian Land, Thereby Preempting Oregon’s Statutes. 
As stated earlier, Public Law 280 gave six states, including Oregon, 
extensive criminal and civil jurisdiction over offenses committed by or 
against Indians in Indian country.  18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006).  Additionally, 
Public Law 280 clearly provides that the General Crimes Act (25 U.S.C. § 
1152) and the Major Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1153) no longer applied in 
those regions.  Id. § 1162(c).  Federal power to enforce those two statutes 
was fully supplanted by the power of the mandatory Public 280 states in the 
areas over which they were granted jurisdiction.  Nonetheless, federal 
power to enforce federal laws of general applicability—actions that 
Congress has declared illegal regardless of where they occur—remains 
even though the amendment to Public Law 280 refers to the “exclusive” 
authority of the States over conduct that falls within the scope of the Major 
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Crimes or General Crimes Acts.  See United States v. Anderson, 391 F.3d 
1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2004); see 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c).  For example, the 
court in United States v. Wadena, held that crimes of general applicability 
remained within the subject matter of the federal courts despite the passage 
of Public Law 280 and its delegation of criminal jurisdiction to certain 
states.  152 F.3d 831, 842 (8th Cir. 1998).  In that case, the chairman, 
treasurer, and councilman of the White Earth Reservation Tribal Council 
were convicted in federal court of many crimes related to the 
misapplication of tribal funds.  Id. at 837.  On review, the Eighth Circuit 
summarily rejected the assertion that under Public Law 280, the federal 
government had surrendered to Minnesota its criminal jurisdiction over all 
federal offenses committed on Indian lands.  The court reiterated that 
crimes of general applicability were not affected by the enactment of Public 
Law 280 and remained within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.  Id. at 842. 
Since Public Law 280, Congress has passed two significant and 
extensive laws of general applicability that govern the archaeological 
preservation of culturally significant sites and resources.  The purpose and 
intent behind these pieces of legislation indicates that Congress sought to 
have exclusive authority over this area of law, particularly with respect to 
remains, sites, and objects of Native American tribes.   
In 1979, Congress passed Archaeological Resources Protection Act, in 
part, to “secure, for the present and future benefit of the American people, 
the protection of archaeological resources and sites which are on public 
lands and Indian lands.”  16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (2012).  The primary 
motivation behind ARPA was the need to provide more effective law 
enforcement to protect archaeological sites.  ARPA defines an 
“archaeological resource” as “any material remains of past human life or 
activities which are at least 100 years of age, and which are of 
archaeological interest.”  43 C.F.R. § 7.1(a) (2006); 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) 
(2012).  ARPA defines “public lands,” inter alia, as the “lands the fee title 
to which is held by the United States.”  Id. § 470bb(3)(B).  “Indian lands” 
are defined as “lands of Indian tribes, or Indian individuals, which are either 
held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States.  Id. § 470bb(4).   
ARPA states that an Indian tribe or member thereof is not required to 
obtain a permit for the excavation or removal of any archaeological 
resources located on Indian lands of such Indian tribe.  16 U.S.C. § 
470cc(g)(1).  The exception to this general rule states that an individual is 
required to obtain a permit in the absence of tribal law regulating the 
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excavation or removal of archaeological resources on Indian lands.  Id.  
Section 6 of ARPA details the range of prohibited activities, including 
removal, damage, or defacement in addition to unpermitted excavation or 
removal.  16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a).   
Shortly after the passage of the ARPA, Congress enacted the Native 
American Grave and Protection Repatriation Act with the principle 
objective of establishing a legal regime for the protection of Native 
American human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of 
cultural patrimony presently on federal and tribal lands from unauthorized 
excavation or removal.  United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 799-800 
(10th Cir. 1997) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 101-877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 
1990, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4368) (emphasis added).  In 
addition to repatriation and graves protection, NAGPRA also establishes a 
criminal prohibition on trafficking in Native American human remains and 
cultural items in violation of the statute.  See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1170 
(2012) (emphasis added).  The law provides that Indian tribes or 
descendants of the deceased have the ownership and control over human 
remains and cultural items which are excavated on federal lands when 1) 
lineal descendancy or cultural affiliation can be shown; 2) tribal land is 
involved; or 3) where an Indian tribe has successfully obtained a land 
claims judgment establishing that a given piece of federal land was within 
its aboriginal territory.  25 U.S.C. 3002(a) (2012). 
NAGPRA defines “sacred objects” as “specific ceremonial objects which 
are needed by traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice 
of traditional Native American religions by their present day adherents.”  25 
U.S.C. § 3001(3)(C).  A literal reading of this definition reveals that any 
artifact deemed a “sacred object” must be connected to the practice of an 
American Indian religion by present-day peoples.  Bonnichsen v. United 
States, 367 F.3d 864, 879 (9th Cir. 2004).  
According to NAGPRA, the intentional excavation of sacred objects and 
objects of cultural patrimony from federal land is allowed only if 1) the 
objects are excavated or removed following the requirements of ARPA, 2) 
the objects are excavated after consultation with or, in the case of tribal 
lands, consent of, the appropriate Indian tribe, 3) disposition of the objects 
is consistent with their custody, and 4) proof of the consultation or consent 
is shown to the Federal agency official responsible for issuing the required 
permit.  43 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2006).   
 Passed in 1993, three years after the enactment of NAGPRA, Or. Rev. 
Stat. 358.905-358.961 were in enacted and provide, in part, definitions of 
terms, types of prohibited conduct along with exceptions, and criminal 
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enforcement procedures relating to archaeological objects and sites.  Or. 
Rev. Stat. 390.235-390.240 explains that an individual is required to first 
obtain a permit in order to excavate or remove archaeological and historical 
material on public lands or otherwise is subject to criminal penalty.  The 
Oregon statute defines an “archaeological object” and a “sacred object” in 
the same manner as the definitions in ARPA and NAGPRA, respectively.  
Or. Rev. Stat. 358.905-358.961 (2011); Or. Rev. Stat. 390.235-390.240 
(2011).  A person must first obtain a permit to either excavate or alter an 
archaeological site on public lands or remove from public lands any 
material of an archaeological, historical, prehistoric, or anthropological 
nature, and failure to obtain a permit results in a Class B misdemeanor.  Or. 
Rev. Stat § 390.325(7).  If an individual excavates or removes from the land 
any materials of archaeological, historical, prehistoric, or anthropological 
nature without obtaining the required permit, any native Indian human 
remains, funerary goods, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony 
must be returned to the appropriate Indian tribe.  Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.237. 
A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the 
power to preempt state law.  Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (citing U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2).  Consideration of 
issues arising under the Supremacy Clause “starts with the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . 
Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  However, Congress often 
does not clearly state in its legislation whether it intends to preempt state 
laws; and in such instances, the courts normally sustain local regulation of 
the same subject matter unless it conflicts with federal law or would 
frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of 
the circumstances that federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 
as to make it reasonable that Congress sought to occupy the field to the 
exclusion of the States.  Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 
(1978); Rice, 331 U.S. at 239.  This Court has found that even when a State 
law is not in direct conflict with a Federal law, the State law could still be 
found unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause if the “state law is an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress’ full purposes 
and objectives.”  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.  When Congress intends federal 
law to “occupy the field,” state law in that area is preempted.  Id. at 372. 
In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, this Court has stated that 
although a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its authority is 
preempted under familiar principles of preemption, preemption of state 
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laws affecting Indian tribes should not be limited only to those 
circumstances given the “unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty” 
and the “federal commitment to tribal self-sufficiency and self-
determination.”  New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 
334 (1983).  Additionally, this Court has “rejected a narrow focus on 
congressional intent to preempt state law as the sole touchstone” and that 
“preemption requires an express congressional statement to that effect.”  Id.  
Rather, this Court has stated that the preemption analysis should rest 
principally on a consideration of the nature of the competing interests at 
stake, offering the following rule: state jurisdiction is preempted by the 
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and 
tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are 
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.  See id. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals erred in affirming that Oregon statutes 
regarding the excavation or removal of archaeological or historical material 
are applicable to the Cush- Hook Nation’s sacred totems located within 
Kelley Point Park because application of the statutes was preempted by 
federal law.  Captain moved back into the Cush-Hook Nation’s ancestral 
homelands in modern-day Kelley Point Park, in part, to protect trees aging 
over 300 years old that are culturally and religiously significant to the 
Cush-Hook Nation.  ROA at 2.  The trees are considered critical to the 
Cush-Hook religion and culture because tribal shamans carved totem and 
religious symbols into living trees hundreds of years ago, which was 
verified in Clark’s journal descriptions from 1806.  ROA at 2.  As the lower 
court correctly found, the tree that Thomas Captain cut down was of 
archaeological, cultural, and historical significance because it represented a 
tribal cultural and religious symbol.  FOF 7.  Despite the inherent value of 
these sacred totems, the State did nothing to stop vandals from defacing the 
images and cutting them off the trees to sell.  ROA at 2.  In response to the 
State’s failure to protect the images, Captain sought to restore and protect a 
vandalized image that had been carved by one of his ancestors by cutting 
the tree down and removing the section of the tree which contained the 
image.  ROA at 2. 
There is clear evidence that Congress intended NAGPRA to be the 
“supreme law of the land.”  The 2010 Federal Register states that 
“NAGPRA is Federal law, and, as such, under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution preempts any state law on the same subject matter . . . This is 
especially true in the field of Federal Indian law, where the United States 
has plenary and exclusive power.”  43 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2006) (citing U.S. 
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).   
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The Oregon statutes seek to tread into an area of law that has clearly 
been occupied by the federal government through two congressional acts 
that provide a comprehensive legal regime for archaeological and cultural 
preservation of sites and resources relating to Native American people.  
Oregon law states that “a person may not excavate, injure, destroy, or alter 
an archaeological site or object or remove an archaeological object on 
public or private lands in Oregon unless that activity is authorized by a 
permit.”  Or. Rev. Stat. § 358.920(1)(a) (2011).  “Public lands” means “any 
lands owned by the State of Oregon, a city, county, district, or municipal or 
public corporation in Oregon.”  Or. Rev. Stat. § 358.905(1)(j) (2011).  
However, because Kelley Point Park is actually considered “Indian 
country” and not under the State’s ownership, Oregon seeks to exert its 
authority over land which is outside the confines of its statutory limits.   Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 358.905 provides definitions for “archaeological object” and 
“sacred object” that are nearly identical to the definitions of those words in 
ARPA and NAGPRA, respectively.  Additionally, the State of Oregon’s 
attempt to require the acquisition of permits through the State Parks and 
Recreation Department directly conflicts with ARPA’s requirement to 
obtain a permit for the use, removal, or excavation of essentially the same 
archaeological artifacts and objects.  Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.235(1)(a). 
This Court should reaffirm its holding in Mescalero Apache Tribe and 
declare that the State of Oregon is without jurisdiction to exercise its 
authority in this area of law because the Oregon statutes are preempted by 
federal law and the federal government has a “commitment to tribal self-
sufficiency and self-determination” that would be comprised by an 
interjection of state authority.  See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 
334.  Following the analysis set forth by this Court in Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, Oregon’s jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law 
because it interferes with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, 
and there is no sufficient state interest at stake to justify the assertion of 
Oregon’s authority.  This is clearly demonstrated by Oregon’s failure to 
stop the recent acts of vandalism that have resulted in the defacing, theft, 
and trafficking of the Cush-Hook Nation’s sacred totems, which the State 
now claims it will protect.  ROA at 2.  Even if Congress has not clearly 
stated an intention to preempt state laws, the evidence above makes clear 
that from the totality of the circumstances, federal law so thoroughly 
occupies this legislative field as to make it reasonable that Congress sought 
to occupy the field, and the existence of conflicting state laws would 
frustrate the federal body of law regarding the preservation of 
archaeological, cultural, and historical objects relating to Native American 
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tribes.  See Malone, 435 U.S. at 504; Rice, 331 U.S. at 239.  Therefore, we 
ask this Court overturn the lower court’s ruling that Thomas Captain is 
guilty for violating Or. Rev. Stat. § 358.905-358.961 and Or. Rev. Stat        
§ 390.235-390.240 on the grounds that Oregon does not have criminal 
jurisdiction to control the uses of, and to protect, the archaeological, 
cultural, and historical objects on the Cush-Hook Nation’s ancestral 
homelands situated in modern-day Kelley Point Park because Oregon’s 
laws are preempted by federal law. 
Conclusion 
For all the foregoing reasons, Thomas Captain respectfully requests this 
Court to uphold the decision in part and reverse in part. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold the Cush-Hook 
Nation’s establishment and current exercise of aboriginal title to the lands 
in Kelley Point Park was correct and should be upheld.  The Cush-Hook 
Nation has established aboriginal title to the lands and Congress has not 
extinguished this title through purchase, conquest or explicit action.  
Additionally, the relocation of the Cush-Hook Nation did not constitute 
abandonment of the Nation’s aboriginal title.  Thus, the land remains under 
the aboriginal title of the Cush-Hook Nation and should be affirmed. 
Further, Thomas Captain respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
Oregon Court of Appeals with respect to state government’s alleged 
criminal jurisdiction to control the uses of, and to protect, archaeological, 
cultural, and historical objects on the land in Kelley Point Park.  The land at 
issue is not under the jurisdiction of the State of Oregon because it is 
federal land.  Accordingly, Oregon Court of Appeals erred in its application 
of the state regulatory laws through Public Law 280 and its decision should 
be overturned. 
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